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Introduction
Half the world’s population does not have essential health ser-
vices and many more do not have access to clean water, sanita-
tion or education, all of which can contribute as much to health 
outcomes as health care.1–3 Many of the sustainable development 
goals (SDGs) address these issues and include targets for health 
coverage and determinants of health.4 In particular, SDG 3 fo-
cuses on good health and well-being, with target 3.8 being the 
achievement of universal health coverage (UHC) for all, without 
financial risk, by 2030. However, universal coverage does not 
imply that all health interventions should be free. Instead, the 
intention is to reduce the fraction of the population that spends 
a substantial portion of their household income on health and 
is, thus, at risk of financial hardship. Outcome indicators associ-
ated with target 3.8 reflect health coverage and the proportion of 
households with catastrophic health spending,1,5 which occurs 
when out-of-pocket payments on health exceed a certain per-
centage of household income, either 10% or 25%(Box 1).7 When 
out-of-pocket payments make up less than 20% of a country’s 
total health expenditure, catastrophic spending for households 
is much less likely. However, in low-income countries, these 
payments account for 42% of total health expenditure; in lower-
middle-income countries, the proportion is 56%.4 
Even though all countries have pooling mechanisms for 
health, such as health ministry budgets and prepaid health 
insurance, out-of-pocket payments continue to be critical. The 
hope is that establishing UHC will reduce poverty (SDG 1), 
given that 12% of the world’s population spend more than 10% 
of their household income on health.1 Moreover, a reduction in 
the household budget allocated to health could boost educational 
attainment (SDG 4), which in turn could increase gender equity 
(SDG 5), stimulate economic growth (SDG 8) and promote a 
just and inclusive society (SDG 16).1
The achievement of UHC will largely be determined by 
the capacity of governments to provide, or regulate the private 
provision of, health services. In 2009, the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) estimated that providing UHC would require the 
expenditure of at least 54 United States dollars (US$) per capita 
each year.8 In 2012, the figure was updated to at least US$ 86 per 
capita, with the added condition that a country should spend at 
least 5% of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health.8 More 
recent recommendations are for a minimum of US$ 112 per capita 
(at 2014 values) and 7.5% of GDP allocated to health by 2030. 
This increase was due to higher current baseline spending, more 
ambitious targets and inclusion of the cost of tackling noncom-
municable diseases.9
Many people believe that, if UHC is to be provided sus-
tainably, it should be funded domestically. This approach may 
be feasible because domestic financing is responsible for 70% 
of total health expenditure in low-income countries and 86% 
in lower-middle-income countries.8 Most funding comes from 
out-of-pocket payments because many governments spend small 
amounts on health,10 often only a fraction of the US$ 86 per 
capita required annually and well below 5% of GDP.11 Moreover, 
domestic government health expenditure is a smaller percentage 
of overall government expenditure in lower-income countries 
than in wealthier countries. For example, in 2015 the average 
proportion of the overall government budget allocated to health 
was 5% in lower-middle-income countries, 10% in upper-
middle-income countries and 23% in high-income countries.12
Government health expenditure comes from public or 
pooled funds, from either general government revenue or social 
health insurance contributions.13 However, collecting insurance 
contributions from unwaged citizens working in the informal 
sector can be difficult and general government revenue is a more 
likely source of funding in many countries. As government 
revenue increases, so does health expenditure. In low-income 
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countries, for instance, a 10% increase in 
tax revenue has been estimated to lead 
to a 17% increase in government health 
expenditure.14 However, in 2018, the 
average general government revenue per 
capita was only around US$ 100 in low-
income countries and around US$ 400 in 
lower-middle-income countries.15 There-
fore, spending more on health, to provide 
UHC, needs higher government revenue.
In low- and lower-middle-income 
countries, 70% of general government 
revenue comes from taxes;16 the balance 
is from grants and non-tax revenues, 
such as royalties from natural resource 
extraction. As a percentage of GDP, tax 
is much higher in high-income coun-
tries, at around 40%, than in low- and 
lower-middle-income countries, where 
it is around 20%, although it is increas-
ing.17 This large gap in tax receipts may, 
for example, be due to: (i) international 
corporate tax avoidance; (ii) failure to tax 
the informal sector or high-net-worth 
individuals; or (iii) tax incentives granted 
to the corporate sector by governments 
to attract foreign investment.16 Other 
sources of lost government revenue, 
which are beyond the scope of this study, 
include theft from the public purse and 
debt repayment.18
Tax avoidance in the informal sector 
and granting tax incentives are within 
the remit of governments and could be 
curtailed.19 In many low- and lower-
middle-income countries, the informal 
sector accounts for 40% of GDP. Failure 
to tax this sector is partly logistical and 
partly a lack of political will. As in all 
countries, the wealthy and the political 
elite may have an undue influence on 
tax policies and their administration.16,20 
Tax incentives or waivers are often given 
to attract foreign investment, but there 
is no evidence that these drive economic 
growth (Stausholm, Copenhagen Busi-
ness School, unpublished observations, 
2017) and signing tax treaties with tax 
havens or low-tax jurisdictions has a 
substantial impact on revenue.21
Corporate tax is an indispensable 
source of income for all countries, par-
ticularly low- and lower-middle-income 
countries, where it accounts for 20% of 
government revenue. In wealthy coun-
tries, the proportion is 10%.20 However, 
corporate tax avoidance has been esti-
mated at US$ 500 to 650 billion interna-
tionally each year, with one third occur-
ring in low- and lower-middle-income 
countries where such tax avoidance has 
a disproportionately large impact on the 
government revenue needed for public 
services.22,23 In these countries, the in-
come generated by corporations within 
their borders is one of the few additional 
sources of public funding realistically ac-
cessible over the short to medium term. 
Although recouping international corpo-
rate tax may not automatically result in 
improved public services, it will increase 
the chance of improvement.24
The responsibility for international 
corporate tax avoidance lies with a broad 
group of actors, including: (i) multina-
tional corporations themselves; (ii) gov-
ernments of high-income countries, 
where parent companies are usually based 
and therefore regulated; and (iii) govern-
ments of low- and lower-middle-income 
countries.25 In theory, corporate income 
tax is payable when a multinational cor-
poration begins to realize profits. How-
ever, there are techniques for reducing a 
corporation’s tax base (referred to as base 
erosion and profit-shifting); for example, 
overpricing costs and under-reporting 
profits (i.e. mispricing). Mispricing can 
also include overpayment for intangible 
services, such as intellectual property or 
managerial support. Furthermore, when 
borrowing from a related entity (i.e. a 
business with a separate legal existence) 
in a low-tax jurisdiction, repayment 
with interest allows profits to be shifted 
to that jurisdiction. The rules governing 
the selling of goods or services between 
related entities include the principle that 
multinational corporations theoretically 
charge related entities the same price as 
they would an independent company.
However, this principle is frequently cir-
cumvented, often by using tax havens.26 
The existence of differential tax rates 
between countries provides an incentive 
for multinational corporations to move 
profits out of high-tax jurisdictions into 
tax havens by setting up a related entity 
or subsidiary. In addition, tax treaties, 
which rarely benefit low-income coun-
tries, are commonly used to minimize 
tax by diverting profits through an entity 
based in a country that has a favourable 
treaty in place.27
Given the potential of UHC to reduce 
poverty and increase economic growth, 
it is vital to consider how health care can 
be sustainably financed. As most general 
government revenue comes from taxes, 
identifying the reasons for gaps in tax 
revenue is a priority. National govern-
ments have the power to reduce some 
Box 1. Glossary of financial terms
Government health expenditure: financial outlay by government entities to purchase health-
care services and goods, which can come from both domestic and external funding sources 
(mainly grants administered by government or loans channelled through the national budget) 
– often reported as a percentage of GDP.
Domestic government health expenditure: government health expenditure that comes 
from domestic sources only.
Household out-of-pocket payments: a household’s outlay on health care, including direct 
payments to public and private health-care providers and non-profit institutions and non-
reimbursable cost-sharing, such as deductibles, co-payments and fees for services.
Total health expenditure: national expenditure on health care, including government 
health expenditure, out-of-pocket payments, prepaid private health insurance (by families and 
employers) and development assistance for health.
Tax avoidance: the legal practice of seeking to minimize a tax bill by taking advantage of a 
loophole or adopting an unintended interpretation of the tax code.
Base erosion and profit-shifting: tax-avoidance strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in 
tax rules to artificially erode the tax base in a country and shift profits to low- or no-tax locations.
Tax evasion: intentionally defrauding revenue authorities rather than using loopholes or legal 
methods.
Illicit financial flows: (i) mostly commercial tax avoidance or evasion (sometimes called ‘legal 
capital’ illicit financial flows, for example from tax abuse involving income or profits that were 
originally earned legitimately); and (ii) about one quarter to one third resulting from laundering 
the proceeds of criminal activity and a small percentage due to corruption or theft (sometimes 
called ‘illegal capital’ illicit financial flows).
Tax haven or low-tax jurisdiction: a country or place with a low tax rate, in which people 
often choose to live or register companies to avoid paying higher tax in their own countries. 
Tax havens undermine the finances of countries where real economic activity takes place by 
providing some combination of secrecy and manipulative tax rules that make it possible to 
book and hide business that should be taxed or regulated elsewhere. (An estimated 10% of 
the world’s GDP is held offshore).6
GDP: gross domestic product.
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gaps, for example, by curtailing tax incen-
tives. Other gaps are the responsibility 
of the international community, which 
has committed to achieving UHC within 
SDG 3. In addition, SDG 17.1 target calls 
for international efforts to strengthen 
domestic resource mobilization.
The aims of this study were to com-
pare losses from international corporate 
tax avoidance in individual countries and 
domestic government health expenditure, 
with reference to the recommended 
annual threshold of US$ 86 per capita 
required for UHC, and to discuss how 
such tax avoidance could be curtailed.
Methods
A glossary of financial terms used here 
are presented in Box 1. I performed a 
cross-sectional study of countries at all 
income levels to compare losses from 
government revenue due to international 
corporate tax avoidance with domestic 
government health expenditure. As tax 
avoidance tends to be hidden, indirect 
methods have evolved to estimate its mag-
nitude. The World Bank residual model, 
for example, examines the difference be-
tween funds entering a country and that 
country’s total expenditure. Any shortfall 
in expenditure is regarded as reflecting 
illicit financial flows. Other approaches 
examine trade data using, for example, a 
trade-mirror approach: mismatches are 
sought between what a country reports it 
exports and what the corresponding im-
porting countries report.28,29 This method 
has been criticized for making too many 
assumptions.30 Rather than looking at 
financial flows, some researchers have 
studied the wealth held in tax havens. 
However, limited data are available.
The data used here were taken from 
an analysis done by Cobham and Janský, 
who repeated an earlier analysis per-
formed by the International Monetary 
Fund.22,23 Cobham and Janský estimated 
the tax revenue an individual country 
would gain in 2013 if the opportunity 
for profit-shifting to tax havens were 
eliminated by raising the average corpo-
rate income tax rate in tax havens to the 
domestic rate. The extent to which differ-
entials in tax rates drive differences in tax 
revenues was estimated using regression 
analysis, with the domestic corporate 
income tax rate as the dependent vari-
able and the corresponding tax rate in tax 
havens as an independent variable. There 
were several differences between Cobham 
and Janský’s analysis and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s study: (i) govern-
ment revenue data were obtained from 
the United Nations University’s World 
Institute for Development Economics 
Research (UNU-WIDER) and cover more 
years for some countries;15 (ii) Bermuda, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Singapore and Switzerland were included 
as tax havens; and (iii) critically, results 
were presented for individual countries. 
Nevertheless, the findings of both stud-
ies were similar. Tax avoidance data were 
available as a percentage of GDP and were 
converted into US$ per capita at the dol-
lar’s 2010 value.
I obtained estimates of national health 
expenditure, including total health expen-
diture and domestic government health 
expenditure, from WHO’s expenditure 
database for 2013 to allow direct com-
parison with tax avoidance data.31 A full 
description of the data and data sources 
is available from the author on request.
Results
Data on international corporate tax avoid-
ance in 2013 were available for 100 coun-
tries: 24 low-, 28 lower-middle-, 21 upper-
middle- and 27 high-income countries. 
Fig. 1 shows that domestic government 
health expenditure was well below 5% of 
GDP in low-, lower-middle- and upper-
middle-income countries. In low-income 
countries, average corporate tax avoidance 
was larger than domestic government 
health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
In addition, Table 1 shows that the aver-
age government revenue in low-income 
countries was just over US$ 100 per capita 
each year and that corporate tax avoidance 
per capita (average: US$ 15.60) was almost 
twice domestic government health expen-
diture (average: US$ 8.35). 
If the lost international corporate tax 
were recouped and reallocated to the health 
sector, the average government health ex-
penditure in the low-income countries stud-
ied could increase from around US$ 8 per 
capita annually to around US$ 24 per capita 
and that in lower-middle-income coun-
tries could increase from around US$ 54 
to around US$ 91 per capita, above the 
recommended annual threshold of US$ 86 
per capita. However, the data available 
indicate that domestic government health 
expenditure in 2013 was below US$ 86 in 
all 24 low-income countries and in 24 of the 
28 lower-middle-income countries studied 
(Fig. 2). Moreover, international corporate 
tax avoidance per capita was greater than 
domestic government health expenditure 
per capita in 19 low-income countries and 
10 lower-middle-income countries.
Discussion
This analysis found that, on average in 
2013, government revenue lost to inter-
national tax avoidance in low-income 
countries was greater than domestic 
government health expenditure when 
assessed either as a percentage of GDP or 
on a per capita basis. In 2013, per-capita 
Fig. 1. Revenues lost to international corporate tax avoidance in comparison to 
domestic government health expenditure, by country income level, 2013
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domestic government health expenditure 
was far below the annual US$ 86 target 
for achieving UHC in all low-income 
countries studied and in most lower-
middle-income countries.
The main limitation of the study was 
the availability and reliability of tax avoid-
ance data. Currently, the magnitude of tax 
avoidance can be estimated only indirectly, 
but increased transparency, new methods 
and new data leaks should lead to im-
provements in the future.6 The secondary 
data used here were consistent with those 
in an earlier analysis, with the advantage 
that estimates are provided for individual 
countries. Although indirect methods will 
always be questioned, the findings of the 
two studies give some indication of the 
scale and potential of the health-care gains 
that could result from increased domestic 
resource mobilization. These results will 
add to current pressure for greater trans-
parency and better tax avoidance data.
This study showed the potential gains 
of curtailing corporate tax avoidance in 
terms of the estimated cost of UHC and 
current government spending on health. 
One cannot assume, however, that all 
recovered revenues would be channelled 
towards the health sector because each 
country allocates revenue in accordance 
with its own priorities and the bargaining 
power of different ministries. One study 
of 25 countries that received debt relief 
found that expenditure on education, 
preventative health care and infrastruc-
ture increased on average by 2.5% of 
GDP as a result.32 In addition, recouping 
corporate tax revenues may decrease re-
liance on other sources of taxation, such 
as consumption taxes, which have been 
considered regressive and have been as-
sociated with increased child mortality. 
Less reliance on consumption taxes may 
indirectly improve health.33 Moreover, 
allocating recouped revenues to other 
sectors of society, for example the edu-
cational or agricultural sector, may have 
a greater impact on economic growth. A 
study showed that an increase in spending 
on education of 1.0% of GDP was associ-
ated with an increase in per-capita GDP 
of 1.4%; by comparison, a similar increase 
in health spending was associated with a 
0.5% increase in per-capita GDP.34 Other 
considerations that could influence the 
allocation of recouped revenues are 
whether revenue generation and alloca-
tion in a country are decentralized and 
whether the revenue from international 
corporations is mainly generated in one 
part of the country.35
As countries grow economically, 
government health expenditure gener-
ally increases as a proportion of total 
health expenditure and out-of-pocket 
payments decrease. Reliance on out-of-
pocket payments is slowly declining in 
all WHO regions as countries take actions 
to address catastrophic health spending: 
in low-income countries, out-of-pocket 
payments decreased from 54% of total 
health expenditure in 1995 to 42% in 
2015.36 However, this decrease resulted 
from increased aid for health, rather than 
from greater domestic government health 
expenditure, which still accounted for 
only 25% of total health expenditure.8,37 
Although I found that international 
corporate tax avoidance in low-income 
countries was almost twice domestic 
government health expenditure on aver-
age, even channelling all the revenue lost 
into the health sector would still result 
in government health expenditure being 
far below the US$ 86 threshold. Conse-
quently, many countries will still rely on 
out-of-pocket payments for the foresee-
able future and these payments will be 
essential for financing UHC. 
Governments could use the revenue 
recouped from corporate tax avoidance to 
increase the efficiency and quality of both 
public and private (including aid-funded) 
health facilities. In particular, substantial 
improvements could be achieved for 
relatively small amounts of money by 
regulating and managing performance 
and ensuring measures are in place to 
protect vulnerable patient groups from 
catastrophic health costs. Private clinics 
could be offered incentives to prioritize 
government-determined health goals, 
thereby maximizing the benefit of both 
public and private investment in health. 
Beneficiaries of these incentives could 
agree to regular evaluation by government 
agencies, which would increase the qual-
ity and efficiency of the private market 
and improve transparency. One strategy 
for improving the quality and efficiency 
of health systems is performance-based 
financing, which has been embraced by 
many countries. This strategy can promote 
dialogue between health-care purchasers, 
providers and other stakeholders.38 Despite 
some criticism,39 many experts working in 
Africa have found this strategy useful when 
Table 1. Estimated revenues lost to international corporate tax avoidance in comparison 
to domestic government health expenditure, by country income level,2013
Parameter No. of 
obser-
vations
Value in US$a
Mean (SD) Range
Low-income countries (n = 24)
Revenues lost to corporate tax avoidance 
per capita
24 15.6 (13.1) 3.0–65.1
Domestic government health 
expenditure per capita
24 8.4 (4.6) 1.5–22.2
Government revenue per capita 22 107.7 (58.9) 16.9–261.2
Lower-middle-income countries (n = 28)
Revenues lost to corporate tax avoidance 
per capita
28 37.4 (29.0) 6.4–98.2
Domestic government health 
expenditure per capita
28 54.0 (48.5) 3.5–186.0
Government revenue per capita 25 416.5 (276.4) 81.4–1186.0
Upper-middle-income countries (n = 21)
Revenues lost to corporate tax avoidance 
per capita
21 134.2 (117.2) 1.1–472.9
Domestic government health 
expenditure per capita
21 234.2 (119.8) 79.0–560.1
Government revenue per capita 19 1 647.0 (624.5) 811.5–2 903.0
High-income countries (n = 27)
Revenues lost to corporate tax avoidance 
per capita
27 194.7 (227.9) 7.0–1 031.0
Domestic government health 
expenditure per capita
27 2 531.0 (1 588.0) 276.7–5 650.0
Government revenue per capita 26 15 526.0 (10 056.0) 2 211.0–46 053.0
SD: standard deviation; US$: United States dollar.
a  All amounts are expressed in United States dollars at their 2010 value.
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adapted to local needs.40 A small amount 
of recouped public money could drive a 
virtuous circle, in which improved public 
services increase tax morale (i.e. percep-
tions of and attitudes towards taxes) and 
generate more taxes, which can be used to 
strengthen public services further.41
One strategy for tackling interna-
tional corporate tax avoidance, which 
has been proposed by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment and the G20 group of nations, is to 
require large multinational corporations 
to report their economic activity, profits 
and taxes paid in individual countries to 
the revenue authority where the parent 
company is based. In 2015, a package 
of measures on base erosion and profit-
shifting was agreed by 100 countries and 
jurisdictions.42 However, these measures 
were quickly seen to have failed in their 
central goal of ensuring better alignment 
between the place where a corporation’s 
activity occurs and the place where its 
taxable profits are declared. A successor 
framework has just been launched by 
the G20. For the first time, by using a 
formula, taxable profits could be directly 
apportioned between countries according 
to where the corporation’s activity (e.g. 
employment and sales) takes place.43,44
In addition, high-income countries, 
where most parent companies of mul-
tinationals are based, could sanction 
corporations that aggressively avoid tax in 
low- or lower-middle-income countries by 
withdrawing public procurement contracts, 
export credit guarantees and other forms 
of state support.45 Overseas development 
aid and expertise could be used to provide 
training for multinational corporations on 
the importance of business integrity and 
tax responsibility. Furthermore, multina-
tional corporations could report their tax 
contributions publicly in their economic, 
social and governance reports, as favour-
able reports may attract ethical investors. 
Moreover, individual investors and pension 
holders could also contribute to human 
development by ensuring that their invest-
ments or pension funds are in multinational 
corporations that pay tax transparently.25
In conclusion, increased domestic 
government health expenditure is re-
quired to achieve UHC. Expenditure is 
needed for both the direct provision of 
health care and for ensuring quality by 
regulating public and private providers. 
Recouping government revenues lost to 
international corporate tax avoidance 
would be an important step in the right 
direction and is the responsibility of both 
national governments and the interna-
tional community, which has committed 
to improving tax collection in accordance 
with SDG target 17.1. ■
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Fig. 2. Per-capita revenues lost to international corporate tax avoidance in comparison to domestic government health expenditure, 
low- and lower-middle-income countries, 2013
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摘要
国际企业避税行为与国内政府卫生支出
目的 参 照 实 现 全 民 健 康 覆 盖 所 需 的 人 均 86 美
元 (US$) 的年度最低要求，比较各国国际企业避税行
为造成的预计损失和国内政府卫生支出。
方法 我们搜集并比较了 2013 年国际企业避税和国内
政府卫生支出的预估值。
结果 提供了 100 个国家 / 地区的数据 ：24 个低收入国
家、28 个中低收入国家、21 个中高收入国家和 27 个
高收入国家。所有 24 个低收入国家以及 28 个中低收
入国家中的 24 个国家的国内政府卫生支出低于 86 美
元的人均标准。在 19 个低收入国家和 10 个中低收入
国家中，国际企业人均税收损失高于国内政府卫生支
出。如果将国际企业因避税造成的税收损失收回并分
拨给卫生部门，则本文所研究的低收入国家的年均卫
生支出可以从人均 8 美元增加到 24 美元，中低收入
国家的年均卫生支出可以从人均 54 美元增加到 91 美
元。
结论 将国际企业因避税造成的税收损失收回并分拨给
卫生部门有助于低收入和中低收入国家实现全民健康
覆盖，即可持续发展目标 (SDG) 3 的目标。治理避税
问题需要各国政府、跨国公司以及包括个人在内的投
资者之间的通力合作。加强国内资源调动的国际合作
是可持续发展目标 17 的重点。
Résumé
Évitement de l’impôt sur les sociétés au niveau international et dépenses de santé au niveau national
Objectif Comparer les pertes estimées résultant de l’évitement de 
l’impôt sur les sociétés au niveau international dans certains pays et leurs 
dépenses de santé au niveau national, en se référant au seuil annuel de 
86 dollars des États-Unis (US$) par habitant nécessaires pour parvenir à 
une couverture sanitaire universelle.
Méthodes J’ai obtenu et comparé des estimations de l’évitement de 
l’impôt sur les sociétés au niveau international et des dépenses de santé 
au niveau national pour l’année 2013.
Résultats Des données étaient disponibles pour 100 pays: 24 pays à 
faible revenu, 28 à revenu moyen inférieur, 21 à revenu moyen supérieur 
et 27 à revenu élevé. Les dépenses de santé du gouvernement national 
étaient inférieures à 86 US$ par habitant dans les 24 pays à faible revenu 
et dans 24 des 28 pays à revenu moyen inférieur. La perte résultant 
de l’évitement de l’impôt sur les sociétés au niveau international par 
habitant était supérieure aux dépenses de santé du gouvernement 
national dans 19 pays à faible revenu et 10 pays à revenu moyen inférieur. 
Si les revenus perdus en raison de l’évitement fiscal étaient récupérés 
et alloués au secteur de la santé, la moyenne des dépenses de santé 
annuelles du gouvernement pourrait passer de 8 US$ à 24 US$ par 
habitant dans les pays à faible revenu étudiés, et de 54 US$ à 91 US$ 
par habitant dans les pays à revenu moyen inférieur.
Conclusion La récupération des pertes dues à l’évitement de l’impôt 
sur les sociétés à l’échelle internationale et leur allocation au secteur de 
la santé aideraient les pays à faible revenu et à revenu moyen inférieur 
à parvenir à une couverture sanitaire universelle, ce qui correspond 
à une cible de l’objectif de développement durable (ODD) 3. La lutte 
contre l’évitement fiscal exige une coopération entre les gouvernements 
de tous les pays, les sociétés multinationales et les investisseurs, y 
compris les particuliers. La coopération internationale pour améliorer 
la mobilisation des ressources nationales est au cœur de la cible 17.1 
des ODD.
صخلم
ةحصلا لىع ليحلما يموكلحا قافنلإاو ةيلودلا تاسسؤلما ةبيضر بنتج
 تاسسؤلما  ةبيضر  بنتج  ةجيتن  ةيريدقتلا  رئاسلخا  ةنراقم  ضرغلا
 لىع  ليحلما  يموكلحا  قافنلإاو  ،ةدح  لىع  دلب  لك  في  ةيلودلا
 ًايكيرمأ  ًارلاود  86  غلابلا  يونسلا  دلحا  لىإ  ةراشلإا  عم  ،ةحصلا
.ةلماشلا ةيحصلا ةيطغتلا قيقحتل بولطلماو ،درفلل
 تاسسؤلما  ةبيضر  بنجتل  تاريدقتلا  لىع  تلصح  دقل  ةقيرطلا
 ،2013  ماعل  ةحصلا  لىع  ليحلما  يموكلحا  قافنلإاو  ،ةيلودلا
.اهنيب ةنراقلماب تمقو
 تاذ  ةلود  24:ةلود  100  ددعل  ةرفوتم  تانايبلا  تناك  جئاتنلا
 تاذ  ةلود  21و  ،طسوتم  لخد  تاذ  ةلود  28و  ،ضفخنم  لخد
 قافنلإا  ناك.عفترم  لخد  تاذ  ةلود  27و  ،لىعأ  طسوتم  لخد
 في درفلل ًايكيرمأ ًارلاود 86 نم لقأ ةحصلا لىع ليحلما يموكلحا
 لياجمإ نم ةلود 24 فيو ،ضفخنلما لخدلا تاذ 24 ـلا لودلا لك
 تاسسؤلما ةبيضر تناك.لقلأا طسوتلما لخدلا تاذ ةلود 28 ـلا
 ليحلما  يموكلحا  قافنلإا  نم  لىعأ  درفلل  ةبسنلاب  ةعئاضلا  ةيلودلا
 تاذ  لود  10و  ،ضفخنم  لخد  تاذ  ةلود  19  في  ةحصلا  لىع
 دق ،ةبيضرلا بنتج ببسب عئاضلا دئاعلا ناك اذإ.لقأ طسوتم لخد
  طسوتم  ديزي  نأ  نكمي  ،يحصلا  عاطقلل  هصيصتخو  هدادترسا  مت
 24  لىإ  تارلاود  8  نم  ةحصلا  لىع  يونسلا  يموكلحا  قافنلإا
 ،ةساردلل ةعضالخا ضفخنلما لخدلا تاذ لودلا في درفلل ًارلاود
 لودلا  في  درفلل  ًايك يرمأ  ًارلاود  91  لىإ  ًايكيرمأ  ًارلاود  54  نمو
.لقلأا طسوتلما لخدلا تاذ
 تاسسؤلما ةبيضر بنتج نع ةتجانلا رئاسلخا دادترسا نإ جاتنتسلاا
 تاذ  لودلا  دعاسي  فوس  يحصلا  عاطقلل  اهصيصتخو  ،ةيلودلا
  قيقتح في ،لقلأا طسوتلما لخدلا تاذ لودلاو ،ضفخنلما لخدلا
 ةيمنتلا  فده  نم  ةدوشنلما  ةياغلا  وهو  ،ةلماش  ةيحص  ةيطغت
 اًنو اعت  ةبيضرلا  بنتج  بقعت  بلطتي  .(SDG)  ثلاثلا  ةمادتسلما
 ،تاي سنلجا  ةددعتم  تاسسؤلماو  ،لودلا  لك  في  تاموكلحا  ينب
 ليودلا  نواعتل ا  لثميو.متهاذ  دارفلأا  لمشي  ماب  ،نيرمثتسلماو
 (SDG) ةمادتسلما ةيمنتلا فدلهاًرومح ليحلما دراولما ةئبعت ينسحتل
.17.1 مقر
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Резюме
Международное уклонение от уплаты налога на прибыль предприятий и организаций и внутренние 
государственные расходы на здравоохранение
Цель Сравнение оценки ущерба от международного уклонения 
от уплаты налога на прибыль предприятий и организаций в 
отдельных странах и объемов внутренних государственных 
расходов на здравоохранение в сравнении с ежегодным 
порогом в 86 долларов США на душу населения, необходимым 
для достижения всеобщего охвата услугами здравоохранения.
Методы Автор получил и сравнил оценочные данные о суммах 
международного уклонения от уплаты налога на прибыль 
предприятий и организаций и внутренних государственных 
расходах на здравоохранение по состоянию на 2013 год.
Результаты Были доступны данные по 100 странам: 24 страны 
с низким уровнем доходов, 28 стран с уровнем доходов от 
низкого к среднему, 21 страна с уровнем доходов от среднего 
к высокому и 27 стран с высоким уровнем доходов. Внутренние 
государственные расходы на здравоохранение были ниже 
86 долларов США на душу населения во всех 24 странах с низким 
уровнем доходов и в 24 из 28 стран с уровнем доходов от низкого 
к среднему. Объемы ущерба от международного уклонения от 
уплаты налога на прибыль предприятий и организаций были выше, 
чем внутренние государственные расходы на здравоохранение, 
в 19 странах с низким уровнем доходов и в 10 странах с уровнем 
доходов от низкого к среднему. Если бы прибыль, потерянную в 
результате уклонения от уплаты налогов, удалось бы вернуть в 
страну и передать в сектор здравоохранения, можно было бы 
повысить среднегодовые расходы на душу населения с 8 до 
24 долларов США в исследованных странах с низким уровнем 
доходов и с 54 до 91 доллара США в странах с уровнем доходов 
от низкого к среднему.
Вывод Возврат в страну прибыли, потерянной в результате 
международного уклонения от уплаты налога на доход 
предприятий и организаций, и ее ассигнование на нужды сектора 
здравоохранения могли бы помочь странам с низким и средне-
низким уровнем доходов добиться всеобщего охвата услугами 
здравоохранения, то есть достичь цели номер 3 в области 
устойчивого развития (SDG). Борьба с уклонением от уплаты 
налогов требует совместных усилий правительств всех стран, 
многонациональных корпораций и инвесторов, в том числе 
частных лиц. Международное сотрудничество для улучшения 
мобилизации внутренних ресурсов стран является главной 
частью цели SDG 17.1.
Resumen
Evasión del impuesto de sociedades internacional y gasto sanitario del gobierno nacional
Objetivo Comparar las pérdidas estimadas por la evasión del impuesto 
de sociedades internacional en los distintos países y el gasto sanitario de 
los gobiernos nacionales, con referencia al umbral anual de 86 dólares 
estadounidenses (USD) per cápita necesario para lograr la cobertura 
sanitaria universal.
Métodos Se obtuvieron y compararon estimaciones de la evasión 
del impuesto de sociedades internacional y del gasto sanitario de los 
gobiernos nacionales para 2013.
Resultados Los datos estaban disponibles para 100 países: 24 países de 
ingresos bajos, 28 de ingresos medios-bajos, 21 de ingresos medios-altos 
y 27 de ingresos altos. El gasto sanitario de los gobiernos nacionales fue 
inferior a 86 USD per cápita en los 24 países de bajos ingresos y en 24 
de los 28 países de ingresos medios-bajos. La pérdida de impuestos de 
sociedades internacionales per cápita fue mayor que el gasto sanitario de 
los gobiernos nacionales en 19 países de ingresos bajos y 10 de ingresos 
medios-bajos. Si los ingresos perdidos por la evasión de impuestos se 
recuperaran y se asignaran al sector de la salud, el gasto público anual 
medio en salud podría aumentar de 8 a 24 USD per cápita en los países 
de bajos ingresos estudiados, y de 54 a 91 USD per cápita en los países 
de ingresos medios-bajos.
Conclusión La recuperación de las pérdidas debidas a la evasión del 
impuesto de sociedades internacional y su asignación al sector de la 
salud ayudaría a los países de ingresos bajos y medios-bajos a lograr 
la cobertura sanitaria universal, una meta del objetivo 3 del desarrollo 
sostenible (sustainable development goal, SDG). La lucha contra la 
evasión de impuestos requiere la cooperación entre los gobiernos 
de todos los países, las empresas multinacionales y los inversores, 
incluidos los particulares. La cooperación internacional para mejorar la 
movilización de recursos nacionales es el objetivo del SDG 17.1.
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